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CONTAGION EQUILIBRIA IN A MONETARY MODEL
BY CHARALAMBOS D. ALIPRANTIS, GABRIELE CAMERA,
AND DANIELA PUZZELLO'
infinite
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THE MODELOF LAGOSANDWRIGHT(2005) altersthemeetingfriction
ofthe
search
model
to
obtain
in
of
money
typical
degeneracy equilibrium
holdings
and enhanceanalyticaltractability.
It introducesa roundof Walrasian"centralized"trading
aftereach roundofbilateralrandom"decentralized"
trading.
The basic premiseis that,althoughthe populationmeetsrepeatedlyin the
and randompairingsarefrictions
centralized
for
sufficient
market,
anonymity
moneyto be essential(see Lagos and Wright
(2005,p. 466) or Rocheteauand
see Huggettand Krasa (1996) and
Wright(2005,p. 175); fortheessentiality,
Kocherlakota(1998)).
Thisnote,based on Aliprantis,
Camera,and Puzzello(2005) (wheredetails
andproofscanbe found),clarifies
thatanonymity
andrandompairingsare not
an
se
sufficient
to
essential
role
for
are
generate
per
money.Furtherfrictions
The
needed.
is
the
work
of
Ellison
and
Kandori
starting
generally
point
(1994)
outcomesare supported
by"contagionequi(1992),whoprovedthatefficient
libria"in repeatedanonymous
matching
games.We castthemodelin Lagos
and Wright(2005) as an infinitely
repeatedgamewithobservableindividual
actions2and we showtheexistenceof contagionequilibriaifagentsare suffiis notrobustto addinga smallamountofnoise
ciently
patient.This,however,
in theobservation
ofindividual
behavior,becauseequilibriawouldarisesimilar to thosein the continuum
limitwhereindividualbehavioris unobservable (Al-Najjarand Smorodinsky
Levine,and Pesendorfer
(2001),Fudenberg,
and
Pesendorfer
Levine
(1995)).
(1998),
The argumentgoes as follows.There is a unique efficient
allocationthat
is sustainedby"desirable"behavior.So, considera socialnormthatspecifies
autarkyforeveras thesanctionruleifa defectionfromdesirablebehavioris
observed.Centralizedtradingfosters
therapidspreadofsanctionsand so disin all anonymous
matches.Intuitively,
therandommatchcouragesdefections
in thetypicalsearchmodelfragments
theprocessof exchangeof
ingfriction
butintroducing
centralized
goodsand ofinformation,
tradingallowsan informalenforcement
schemeto emerge.Consequently,
moneyceases to be essentialfortheprocessofexchange.In fact,eliminating
moneyimproves
efficiency.
'This researchwas supportedin partbyNSF GrantsSES-01-28039and DMS-04-37210.We
referees
forseveralhelpfulcomments.
thanka co-editorandthreeanonymous
ofagents.Herewe supposethat
2ThemodelinLagos andWright
(2005) assumesa continuum
thefactthatindividual
actionsare observable.
agentsare countableto highlight
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1. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Timeis discreteandinfinite,
indexedbyt = 0, 1, .... Thereis a constant
populationJ = N ofidenticalinfinitely
livedagentsand a singleperishablegood
thatcan be producedbya fraction
ofthepopulationat each date.In each t a
inAliprantis,
Camera,and Puzzello(2006) parmatching
process,as specified
titionsJ intospatiallyseparatedtradinggroupsG,(j) forj E J. Assumethat
Go(j) = {j} and,inall t> 1,letGt(j) = 1j,p,(j)} ift is odd andletG,(j) = J if
t is even,where8t3(j), j withprobability
a foreachj e J.Thus,trading
inodd
while
in
even
periodsis decentralized
(agentsare pairedwithprobability
a),
periodsit is centralized(everyoneis in an economy-wide
group).Agentscan
onlytradeand observeactionsand outcomesin theirmatch,and are anonymous as in Ellison(1994), i.e., theycannotobserveidentities
and histories.
Thereis no commitment
and no enforcement.
Tradeis necessaryforconsumption
to takeplace. In odd periods,in each
matcha flipof a faircoin determines
who is a producerand who is a consumer.In evenperiodseveryonecan produceand consume.Each producer
can supplya E [0,-a]laborto a technology
thattransforms
it intoa goods.He
suffers
a
and
derives
no
from
of
disutility
utility
consumption ownproduction.
In odd (even) periods,everyconsumerhas utility
u,(c) (ue(c)) fromconsumc
0
Assume
that
the
and that
ing > goods.
preferences
satisfy Inada conditions
=
=
i E
1.
+
discount
oc), where and satisfy
Agents
u'e(c*)
(co
ce, payoffs
co (0, 1)
ce onlyifthecurrent
next
u'o(co)
period's
by86
periodis even.
Considera matchG,(j) inperiodt.Agentshavea nontrivial
choiceofaction
as
which
is
when
must
choose
how
much
to
only producers,
they
consumption
to
the
members
of
their
we
the
action
set
of
supply
group.Hence, identify
any
Welet
agentk e Gt(j) byAk = [0,a] ifk is a producerandAk = {0} otherwise.
= X
at,k E Ak be an action,so theactionspace ofprofiles
kEGt(j) Ak
at,jis At,j
The payofffunctionforagent j is vt,j:At,j-+ IR,where
- a

ift is odd,

Uo(a
- ,j,
uj)
Ue(Ct,j) at,j, ift is even,
fu(ct,j)

with

Ctj

ifj Z k and t is odd,
ifj = k and t is odd,

at,k,
0,
liminf

n-+oo nf

at,

, ift is even.

kE(i,...,n)\{jl

Thus,theagent'sutility
dependson howmuchoutputhe receivesinhismatch.
His disutility
dependson howmuchhe producesforhispartners.
Clearly,au=
e
0
all
k
for
is
the
Nash
of
the
static
tarky,
only
G,(j),
equilibrium
game.
at,k
cannotbe forced,
norcantheycommit,
toprovideconsumpIndeed,producers
tion.So, producerj can alwaysselecta,,j = 0 and enjoypayoff
vt,j(at,j)> 0.
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= (ao,j,... , atj)
horizongame.For t > 1 let
Now considertheinfinite
The
setofhistories
be thehistory
ofactionsobservedbyj at 7 < twithho,j= h,,j
O.
t-1
= X
For G,(j), let =
ofj is
and notethatpartners
(ht,k)kEGt(j)
h,,j
A purestrategy
due
to
random
havecommon
do notH,,j
0A,,j.histories,
matching.
ao-for
=
of
o
the infinite
horizongame is an infinite
sequence maps
(so,j,Sl,j,... ),
wheres,j: H,1j-- Aj is definedbyst,j(h,,j)= at,j.The strategy
profilein Gt(j)
letthesequenceof
is s,(ht,j). Whereasactionsetsdo notdependon histories,
denotethestrategy
mappingsS,tj= (A''~
space ofagentj in thesubgame
to
rise
a
at t > 0. Then
every
gives
strategy
starting
oa,,in thesubgameat
o-j
')=,
= (s,j,
=
and
let
a = (o-1, o2, ...) be
E
t,witho-t,j
...)
Finally,
o-0,j u-.
St+l,j,
St,j
thesetofstrategies
ofthepopulationJ,using
crafora subgamein t.
Definetheexpectedperiodutility
Let 5+,1= 8 ift is evenand 1 otherwise.
(1),-

-a,,j,
if
tis
even.
ue(ct,j)
ift is odd,
(1) [uo(ct,j)a, at,j], ift iseven.

we formalize
Whereaseach t > 1 definesa propersubgame,
recursively
j's payoffin t usingthefunction X iSt,d,- R definedby
Vt,j:
(2)
Vtj,(ot) =- t(st(ht,j))+
withVj=

8t+lVt+,j(ort+,)

ofagentj is
The bestresponsecorrespondence
Vo0,j.
= max
p(ar) = o-je So,j:Vj(to-, o-) xjESo,jVj(cr-,x)

Nash equilibrium
fortheinfinite
horizongameis a stratso a subgameperfect
e
for
all
a
such
that
foreveris an
E
J.
Clearly,autarky
egyprofile
j
o-j pj(oa)
not
the
of
because
does
decrease
set
repeatedplay
equilibrium
equilibrium
payoffs.
Whatistheefficient
allocationinthismodel?To answerthis,considera planand facestheirphysicalrestrictions.
She will
nerwhotreatsagentsidentically
in each match.
ask each producerto deliverthesurplus-maximizing
quantity
THEOREM1: An optimal
forallproplan existsand itis unique.Specifically,
ducersk E J wehaveao,k= a* = 0 and whent > 1 wehaveat,k= at = c*ift is
odd and c*ift is even.
2. THEMAINRESULT
The worksbyEllison(1994) and Kandori(1992) suggestthatwe can susallocationusinga contagionstrategy
thatspecifiesdesirable
taintheefficient
desirablebeactionsas wellas sanctionsforundesirableactions.We identify
withtheoptimalplan and we
haviorwithproductiondecisionsthatconform
label everyotheractionas undesirable.
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DEFINITION
2: A strategy
o-f= (so,1,
sl,, ...) fora producerj E is calleda
if
it
=
a*
satisfies
and
in each periodt > 1 we have:
contagion
strategy
so,j
=
=
whenever
and
(i) s,,j(h,,j) a*,
h;j,
whenever = hj.
(ii) s,j(h,j) = 0 forall r > t,ht,j
h,,j
Thus,everyproducerdeliversto hispartnersct consumption
onlyifhe has
observeddesirablebehavior.The producerselectsautarky
foreveras soon as
he deviatesor has knowledgeof a deviation.Can the threatof thisinformal
sustaintheoptimalproduction
punishment
planas a subgameperfect
equilibrium?
THEOREM 3: For each

c*
+c*
0e 2 0
co

6 > 8*

c;

ue(C*) +

e

[uo(C)

-

]

thecontagion
theoptimal
strategy
supports
plan as a subgame
perfect
equilibrium.
cannotlevytaxeswithoutenforcement,
Recallingthata monetary
authority
we see thattheefficient
allocationcannotgenerally
be sustainedina monetary
but
is
attainable
in
a
equilibrium,
nonmonetary
equilibrium
bypatientagents.
ThisholdsforanyJ as longas actionsare observedwithout
noise(Levineand
Pesendorfer
(1995,p. 1161)).
To see why,assumethateveryonefollowsthe contagionstrategy
and consideragentj in t. Strategies
and thestructure
ofthegameare time-invariant
inequilibrium,
so eachsubgameis a replicaoftheinfinite
horizongame.Thus,
theequilibrium
continuation
in
even
or
odd
payoffs
periodsaretime-invariant.
Ifwe denotethemby and
and
we
have
(2),
Ve* Vo*,using(1)
(3)

V*--

1

Ue(c)

-

C

+
[uo(c)

- c]

,

-c]+ue(c*)
=1-81- acc2-[uo(c*)
V
-c*
Vo*
For the optimality
of o-j considerone-timedeviationsin a representative
Let V/dand Vodbe
subgame,inandoffequilibrium
(unimprovability
criterion).
thecontinuation
seen
payoffs
(in evenand odd periods)ifa deviationwasfirst
in thepriorperiod,and use Ve and Vo ifthe deviationwas observedearlier.
is suboptimal
in t odd if-c* +
> Vd and in t evenif
Therefore,
deviating
Ve*of
is without
- + 6V* >
+ 8V/d,wheretime-invariancepayoffs
u(ce)ingenerality
ce
ue(ce)everyone
loss
because
inatmosttwoperiods.
observesa deviation
In equilibrium,
considera deviationby a producerin G,(j). If t is odd,
thenin t + 1 all k G,(j) play a*, because ht+1,k=
all
h+l1,. However,
=
k
have
E
so
in
0
t
1.
7> +
Thus,
agents Gt(j)
theyplaya,k
ht+l,k h+l,k,
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Jd = Ue(cW)-0 +
fork E G,(j). WhereasG,+1(j) = J,everyone
observesa
deviationin t+ 1,81?o
so all k E J haveht+2,k #h2,k andplaya,k = 0 in > t + 2.
= 0 forall
t + 2 and all k E J, and so -= V = 0. Thus,usHence,
o
7>
if8 > 8*.Forthese
in
t
odd
is
defectV7k
parameters,
suboptimal
ing(3), deviating
a
if
which
is
when
defection
is
seen
t
is
also
is
even,
immediately
ing suboptimal
=
=
0 . Finally,
offequilibrium,
after
choosingautarky
byall k E J and so Vd
a deviationisIclearlyin a producer'sbestinterest.
Everyonelearns
observing
cannotbe
ofa deviationwithat mostone perioddelay,so permanent
autarky
avoidedbyforgiving
for)a deviator.
(producing
In sum,efficient
tradesare sustainablewithoutmoneybecause anydeviaof
tionshutsdowntradeveryfast.Pairwiserandomtradeslowsthetransfer
becauseagentsare anonymous.
Obbutcannotpreventitsimply
information,
tradeallowinformational
flowsthatenof actionsand centralized
servability
In
in
match.
our
desirable
behavior
every
working
courage
paper(Aliprantis,
modelthatis immune
Camera,and Puzzello(2005)), we developa matching
wheremoneyis essentialto support
to contagionand presentenvironments
Anotherapproachis
tradein largemarketspopulatedbycompletestrangers.
Shi (1997).
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